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## Domain Architecture - Complete domain-to-service mapping for 16 verified domains - Subdomain architecture for blackroad.systems and blackroad.io - GitHub organization mapping (BlackRoad-OS repos) - Railway service-to-domain configuration - DNS configuration templates for Cloudflare ## Extracted Services ### AIops Service (services/aiops/) - Canary analysis for deployment validation - Config drift detection - Event correlation engine - Auto-remediation with runbook mapping - SLO budget management ### Analytics Service (services/analytics/) - Rule-based anomaly detection with safe expression evaluation - Cohort analysis with multi-metric aggregation - Decision engine with credit budget constraints - Narrative report generation ### Codex Governance (services/codex/) - 82+ governance principles (entries) - Codex Pantheon with 48+ agent archetypes - Manifesto defining ethical framework ## Integration Points - AIops → infra.blackroad.systems (blackroad-os-infra) - Analytics → core.blackroad.systems (blackroad-os-core) - Codex → operator.blackroad.systems (blackroad-os-operator) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
28 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
28 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Codex 14 — Zero-Knowledge Access — Reveal Nothing, Prove Enough
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**Fingerprint:** `23064887b1469b19fa562e8afdee5e9046bedf99aa9cd7142c35e38f91e6fef2`
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## Aim
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Grant access rights based on properties while withholding identity and sensitive attributes.
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## Core
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- Use zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to show membership in policy predicates without revealing the witness: \(\text{ZKPoK}\{w : H(w) = c \wedge P(w) = 1\}\).
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- Apply group or ring signatures to provide signer anonymity with optional linkability.
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- Log nullifiers or other one-time tokens to prevent reuse without deanonymizing.
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## Runbook
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1. Define the policy predicate \(P\) and issue credentials that commit to \(c\).
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2. At access time, present a zero-knowledge proof that \(P(w)\) holds while revealing no personally identifiable information.
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3. Record a nullifier or serial number to detect double-spend or abuse attempts.
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## Telemetry
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- Proof acceptance rate and average generation time.
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- Distribution of nullifier usage and collision monitoring.
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- Credential issuance and revocation volume.
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## Failsafes
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- If the policy predicate drifts or becomes stale, hot-patch it and force credential refresh.
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- Escalate to step-up authentication (such as device attestation) after repeated proof failures or suspected abuse.
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**Tagline:** Permissions by proof, not by passport.
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