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Alexa Amundson
ec7b1445b5
RoadChain-SHA2048: c645c1292ab1555e RoadChain-Identity: alexa@sovereign RoadChain-Full: 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
51 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
51 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Alexa Amundson
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**Security Engineer**
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amundsonalexa@gmail.com | [github.com/blackboxprogramming](https://github.com/blackboxprogramming)
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---
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## Summary
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Found a crypto miner, a cron dropper, and a leaked PAT in my own infrastructure. Cleaned all of it, rotated credentials fleet-wide, and rebuilt security from zero-trust architecture up — because the hardest incidents are the ones inside your own network.
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---
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## Experience
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### BlackRoad OS | Founder & Security Engineer | 2025–Present
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**The Incidents: What I Found and How I Fixed It**
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- Obfuscated cron dropper on Cecilia — exec'ing from /tmp/op.py every 5 minutes. Traced it, removed the cron entry, cleaned /tmp, audited all nodes
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- xmrig crypto miner service configured on Lucidia — unit file referencing mining pool. Service removed, system audited for persistence mechanisms
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- Leaked GitHub PAT (gho_Gfu...) embedded in a systemd service file on Lucidia — removed from config, token revoked on GitHub, all secrets migrated to chmod 600 env files
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- 50+ SSH authorized keys on some nodes — audited every key, identified which ones are active, locked down access paths
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**The Architecture: Trust Nothing by Default**
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- Zero open ports — all external access through Cloudflare tunnels. No port forwarding, no exposed SSH, no public APIs
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- WireGuard encryption for all inter-node traffic. UFW with INPUT DROP policy on edge nodes. Credential rotation enforced fleet-wide
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- GitHub security scanning workflows check for AWS keys, tokens, passwords on every push — catches secrets before they ship
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**The Lesson**
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- Security isn't a feature you add — it's what you find when you actually look. Every fleet needs an adversarial audit, not just a firewall
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---
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## Technical Skills
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incident response, malware analysis, credential rotation, WireGuard, Cloudflare tunnels, UFW, SSH, Linux hardening
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---
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## Metrics
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| Metric | Value | Source |
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|--------|-------|--------|
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| Failed Units | *live* | services.sh — systemctl --failed via SSH |
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| Fleet Nodes | *live* | fleet.sh — SSH probe to all nodes |
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| Systemd Services | *live* | services.sh — systemctl list-units via SSH |
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| Tailscale Peers | *live* | services.sh — tailscale status via SSH |
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| Nginx Sites | *live* | services.sh — /etc/nginx/sites-enabled via SSH |
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| Nodes Online | *live* | fleet.sh — SSH probe to all nodes |
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